Compositionality of programs is an important concern in knowledge representation and software development. In the context of Logic Programming, up till now, the issue has mostly been studied for de nite programs only. Here, we study compositionality in the context of normal open logic programming. This is a very expressive logic for knowledge representation of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge on concepts and on problem domain, in which the compositionality issue turns up very naturally. The semantics of the logic is a generalisation (allowing non-Herbrand interpretations) of the well-founded semantics. We provide a number of results which o er di erent su cient conditions under which the models of the composition of two theories can be related to the intersection of the models of the composing theories. In particular, under these conditions, logical consequence will be preserved under composition.
Introduction
The compositionality issue arises in a situation where two or more experts cooperate to axiomatise a certain domain of application; they have more or less disjunct subdomains of expertise and they represent their expert knowledges independently in distinct logical theories. Ideally, once this stage is nished the problem arises how to combine the knowledge modules in one united theory. In general, there may be di erent modes in which the modules can be composed, but certainly the most important one seems to take the logical conjunction of their knowledges; i.e. to construct a new theory which contains exactly the sum of the knowledges of the component modules. By the nature of the situation, the modules designed by the experts are incomplete representations of the problem domain; they contain uncertainty about the problem domain. Typically, experts will have two sorts of ignorance in their theories: ignorance on relations, some of which are de ned by the other experts; ignorance about the objects some of which are de ned by other experts. A suitable logic to represent knowledge modules should allow to represent these forms of uncertainty. Here, we investigate the compositionality issue in the logic of normal Open Logic Programs (OLP) and First Order Logic (FOL) 10]. 10] presents this logic from a Knowledge Representation perspective and illustrates its suitability for representing uncertainty of similar nature as cooperating experts have to face: incomplete knowledge on the de nitions of certain concepts and on the problem domain. The model semantics of OLP-FOL is an extension of the well-founded semantics 21] and of the extended well-founded semantics 19] and was de ned in 11]. This logic has a possible state semantics, that is, a model correspond to a state in which the problem domain might occur according to the (incomplete) expert knowledge (and not a belief set, a set of believed atoms, as in answer set semantics of Extended Logic Programming). At the level of the semantics, uncertainty on the de nition of a concept is modeled by allowing models which give to the open predicates an arbitrary interpretation which satis es the set of FOL axioms T c (and not e.g. by having truth value unknown for these open predicates as in a belief set semantics). Uncertainty on the level of the domain of discourse (no Domain Closure) is modeled by allowing general, non-Herbrand models. Compositionality of logic programs has been investigated by a number of researchers. We refer to the discussion section for explicit references. In the context of OLP-FOL, the problem of correct composition of di erent independently designed modules has a natural formulation which di ers from the formalisation as presented in much of the existing research. In the context of a logic with possible state semantics, the compositionality criterion that a logic theory T contains precisely the sum of the knowledges in the modules T 1 ; T 2 has a natural formalisation: that the class of models of T is precisely the intersection of the classes of models of T 1 and of T 2 . Note that this criterion is the one expressed by the semantics of classical logic conjunction: models of the conjunction F^G of arbitrary FOL formulas F; G are precisely the models of F and of G.
OLP-FOL
We assume familiarity with basic concepts of logic and logic programming such as logical languages L, atoms, literals, (normal) program clauses or rules based on L, ground instances of rules w.r.t. a language L, 2-valued and 3-valued interpretations, Herbrand interpretations of L. We refer to 17]. We assume some familiarity with the well-founded semantics 21] as well. We introduce some auxiliary concepts. Each language L is assumed to contain propositional predicates > and ?; in each interpretation I of L, > is true and ? is false. H L ( For a ground literal F = p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) in L D ,Ĩ(F) denotes the fact p(Ĩ(t 1 ); : : :;Ĩ(t n )), wherẽ I is the mapping which assigns to each ground term in L D the corresponding domain element of the interpretation I. The truth function of I (i.e. the function which maps positive facts to ff; u; tg) is denoted by H I . We describe a truth function as a set of tuples of facts with truth value (e.g. fp f ; q u ; r t g, meaning that H I (p) = f; H I (q) = u and H I (r) = t). 2-valued Herbrand interpretations are denoted in the conventional notation, as a subset of the Herbrand base.
A theory T in the OLP-FOL logic is a pair (T d ; T c ) with T d a set of normal program clauses p q 1 ; ::; q n ; :r 1 ; ::; :r m (with p; q 1 ; ::; q n ; r 1 ; ::; r m atoms) and T c a set of FOL formulas. A predicate p is de has two models, I 1 = fnot dead t ; alive t g and I 2 = fnot dead f ; alive f g. T 2 has the same two models (alive is open in T 2 ). But only the interpretation I 2 is a model of T 1 T 2 . We see that :alive and :not dead are consequences of the union T 1 T 2 , whereas it is not the case that they are true in every interpretation which is a model of T 1 and of T 2 .
In the next sections we give some conditions on the theories T 1 and T 2 , so that the equality Mod(T 1 T 2 ) = Mod(T 1 ) \ Mod(T 2 ) holds. But generally, for correct theories,T 1 ; T 2 and T 1 T 2 , the inclusion Mod(T 1 T 2 ) Mod(T 1 ) \ Mod(T 2 ) already holds. This means that formulas which are true in every interpretation which is a model of T 1 and T 2 are consequences of T 1 T 2 (but it is possible that T 1 T 2 has more consequences, see example 3.1). Before giving this result, we show in the next example that it is not always the case that the union of two correct theories is correct. Example 3.5 As we will see later (theorem 4.2), there's actually an equality here. 4 The justi cation condition
The aim of this section is to provide a general condition on T 1 and T 2 , so that the equality Mod(T 1 T 2 ) = Mod(T 1 ) \ Mod(T 2 ) ( ) holds, or equivalently, so that the consequences of T 1 T 2 are exactly those formulas which are true in every interpretation which is a model of T 1 and of T 2 . We rst give some motivating examples.
Motivating examples
In the rst example the predicates de ned in T 2 are all 'new', that is, they don't occur in T 1d . Example 4.1
anc(X; Z); parent(Z; Y ) The rst theory T 1 de nes the predicate parent=2 in terms of the predicate father=2 and mother=2, for which there are given some facts. The second theory T 2 de nes the predicate anc=2 in terms of itself and parent=2. Next we give an example in which clauses of T 2 have predicates in their body which are de ned in T 1 , and vice versa (hence, there is a kind of mutual dependency between T 1 and T 2 ). In this example the equality ( ) doesn't hold, and we have a strict inclusion. Example 4.2
father(X) parent(X); male(X) mother(X) parent(X); female(X) male(a) > In T 1 parent=1 is de ned in terms of father=1 and mother=1, while in T 2 father=1 and mother=1 are de ned in terms of parent=1. The Herbrand interpretation I = fmale(a); parent(a); father(a)g is a model of both T 1 and T 2 , but it is not a model of T 1 T 2 . The only Herbrand model of T 1 T 2 is I 0 = fmale(a)g. Example 4.2 suggests that the condition to be put on T 1 and T 2 to obtain the equality ( ) is that only 'new' predicates (i.e. predicates not occuring in T 1d ) can be de ned in T 2 . This condition is surely su cient (see theorem 6.3 in section 6), but is not necessary, as is shown by the following example. Comparing the last two examples, we see that in example 4.2 the dependency between the de ned predicates in T 1 and the de ned predicates in T 2 is an 'in nite' one: parent=1 (T 1 ) is de ned in terms of father=1 (T 2 ), father=1 (T 2 ) is de ned in terms of parent=1 (T 1 ), parent=1 (T 1 ) is de ned in terms of father=1 (T 2 ), . . . .
Whereas in example 4.3, the dependency is a ' nite' one: gr grpar=2 (T 2 ) is de ned in terms of grpar=2 (T 1 ), grpar=2 (T 1 ) is de ned in terms of parent=2 (T 2 ), parent=2 (T 2 ) is de ned totally in T 2 .
A condition in terms of dependency relations is discussed in the next sections. We now give an example which requires a more general condition. The equality ( ) holds, although the dependency between the de ned predicates in T 1 In Event Calculus, there is a broad class of examples for which, like example 4.4, the equality ( ) holds although there is an in nite kind of dependency between the de ned predicates in T 1 and the de ned predicates in T 2 . These examples require a more general condition. In the following subsection we de ne the justi cation condition, which subsumes all the following conditions given in sections 5 and 6. We will also give an example in a sort of Event Calculus to illustrate the justi cation condition.
The justi cation condition
De nition 4.1 Two theories T 1 and T 2 satisfy the justi cation condition if for each interpretation which is a model of the FOL axioms T 1c T 2c it holds that for any fact F Lemma 4.1 Given two correct theories T 1 and T 2 and a model M of T 1 T 2 . Let F be a fact of a predicate de ned in T 1 (resp. T 2 ) with H M (F) = u. Then there is a weak justi cation of F in T 1 (resp. T 2 ) with a leaf G de ned in T 2 (resp. T 1 ) and H M (G) = u. Proof Suppose that, given the conditions, the conclusion of the lemma doesn't hold. Then for every justi cation J of F in T 1 with value u, the facts de ned in T 
on(T) sw(E) ; E < T ; off(E) ; :swturn(E; T) swturn(E; T)
sw(E 1 ) ; E < E 1 ; E 1 < T T 2 :
(
off(T) sw(E) ; E < T ; on(E) ; :swturn(E; T)
Suppose we have a situation in which there is a lamp and a switch. The lamp can be on or o on a certain time. When the lamp is on and we turn the switch, the lamp will be o and vice versa. The lamp is on (resp. o ) on a certain time T if there is an event E before T on which the lamp was o (resp. on) and on which there was a switch and such that there were no switches between E and T. A rst expert de nes the predicate on=1 in terms of the predicate off=1, of which he has no knowledge, resulting in the theory T 1 , and a second expert de nes the predicate off=1 in terms of the predicate on=1, of which he has no knowledge, resulting in the theory T 2 . We would like to know if the union of these two theories contains exactly the sum of the knowledges of the two experts. In particular, we would like to know if the equality Then T 1 , T 2 satisfy the justi cation condition w.r.t. J . Indeed, take an arbitrary interpretation in J . It is obvious that all justi cations of the swturn-facts in T 1 T 2 are nite. We now take a closer look at the justi cations in T 1 T 2 of the on-facts (analogously for the off-facts).
The justi cations of an on-fact, on(t) (t 2 R + ), with only true leaves are always nite. This is because, starting from a given t 2 R + , each elementary justi cation of on(t) is of the form fsw(e); e < t; off(e); :swturn(e; t)g. The fact sw(e) is true only if e 2 D. The fact e < t is true only if e is taken smaller than t. Hence, in a justi cation of on(t) with only true leaves, e < t and e 2 D. We can then repeat the same reasoning for the fact off(e). Because The justi cation condition is a very general condition from which many other conditions can be deduced, like for instance the next proposition, which is an easy corollary to theorem 4.2. Proof Suppose that for each interpretation in J and for every fact F it holds that F or sF has a strong justi cation of nite depth in T 1d T 2d . We prove that T 1d ; T 2d satisfy the justi cation condition. Then the proposition is a direct consequence of theorem 4.2.
Suppose there is an interpretation I in J and a fact F which has a justi cation J 1 in T 1d T 2d with only true leaves (or no leaves) and with an in nite branch with an in nite number of facts de ned in T 1d and an in nite number of facts de ned in T 2d and suppose F has no strong justi cation in T 1d T 2d . We prove that this is impossible. Because F has no strong justi cation in T 1d T 2d , sF has a strong justi cation J 2 of nite depth in T 1d T 2d . By the de nition of justi cation, there is a branch B 1 in J 1 and a branch B 2 in J 2 such that B 1 = sB 2 . But this means that B 1 has a false leaf, which gives a contradiction.
2
In the next sections we introduce some stronger, but more syntactical conditions on the theories T 1 and T 2 such that ( ) still holds.
A more syntactical condition for propositional theories
In this section we restrict ourselves to propositional theories, based on a propositional language L. In the next section we extend to the predicate case again. The condition given in theorem 5.1 is su cient, but not necessary, as was shown in example 4.4.
6 A more syntactical condition for predicate theories
We return to the case of a rst order language L and two theories T 1 and T 2 based on L.
Condition in terms of dependency relation
When we only want to consider Herbrand interpretations, we can use the result of the previous section. Let Ground(T 1 T 2 ) denote the grounding of T 1 T 2 (i.e. of the logic program part and of the FOL axioms) w.r.t. the Herbrand universe. We assume that for each ground atom p of a de ned predicate symbol such that no ground instantiation of a clause has p in the head, the grounding contains the rule p ? Theorem 6.1 Given two theories T 1 and T 2 which are correct w.r. Then I is a non-Herbrand model of T 1 and of T 2 . But I is not a model of T 1 T 2 , because the only model of T 1 T 2 with pre-interpretation J 0 assigns truth value f to all facts even(z); odd(z) with z 2 Z.
But again, the only interpretations which are important w.r.t. these theories are the Herbrand interpretations. And for these interpretations the equality holds, i.e.
Mod H (T 1 T Note that we can not apply theorem 6.2 (with J = H) to obtain the same result, because T 1 and T 2 don't satisfy the conditions of that theorem: there is an in nite descending sequence even=1 odd=1 even=1 : : :;
with even=1 de ned in T 1 and odd=1 in T 2 .
In the last two subsections of this section we give some even stronger, syntactical conditions on T 1 and T 2 to obtain ( ).
Conservative extensions
We rst need some notation. The condition Head(T 2d ) \ Pred(T 1d ) = ; means that only predicate symbols not occuring in T 1d can be de ned in T 2d . Hence, predicate symbols de ned in T 1d can not depend on predicate symbols de ned in T 2d (the converse is possible though). An example was given in section 4, example 4.1.
Under the conditions of theorem 6.3, we are given a way to construct every model of T 1 T 2 by successively nding a model of T 1 and T 2 . Let us be more precise. We discuss these three works in more detail. In 12], they consider programs with import predicates (called units); import predicates correspond to open predicates in our approach. An abstract semantics for units is a function taking in input a set of imported literals and producing another set of literals. They present conservative extensions of the well-founded and Fitting's semantics. These semantics are proved to be compositional w.r.t. union of units, i.e. the semantics of the union can be deduced from the semantics of the components. In case of the extension of the well-founded semantics this is only stated if the system of units is hierarchical, that is to say that there is no circular dependency between the units. Although they use a very di erent terminology and their set-up is di erent, their approach leans closest to ours. In 20] a compositional semantics (which can be seen as a compositional counterpart of Kunen's semantics) for normal programs based on a rst order completion of the program is de ned. De nitions which are not explicitly given in the program are not closed and hence those predicates remain open, which is needed in a modular context. Their semantics is compositional while remaining nonmonotonic to a certain extent. In essence, the semantics is compositional and monotonic on the level of composition of modules, while addition of clauses to modules remains a nonmonotonic operation. In 8] a compositional semantics for logic programs is de ned which handles inconsistencies locally instead of globally. This semantics ful lls the following composition requirement stating that the meaning of a program P is not modi ed if P is extended with a program Q such that none of the atoms de ned in P are also de ned in Q and no de nitions in P depend on atoms de ned in Q (the program Q is in fact a conservative extension of the program P). denoted by its immediate consequence operator T P and not by its set of models. The union of two de nite programs can be proven to correspond to a certain operation on the corresponding T P operators. The result is a highly abstract sort of semantics of a program, which is not really suitable for studying knowledge representation problems, but which allows 3] to de ne many di erent composition operators, all in terms of di erent ways of composing the T P operators of the distinct modules. In comparison, we investigate only one operator, namely the operator which joins the knowledge of the modules. Recently, the algebraic approach of 3] was extended for normal logic programs 4] using Fittings 3-valued completion operator.
In 2] the problem of modelling the composition by union of de nite programs is studied, by considering computed answer substitution as observable behaviour of programs (instead of the more standard notion of success set). To capture this notion of behaviour, programs are denoted by programs (obtained through unfolding) rather than by Herbrand models. The OR-compositional (i.e. compositional w.r.t. program union) semantics of open programs they de ne, corresponds to a program equivalence notion, according to which two programs P 1 and P 2 are equivalent i for any program Q, P 1 Q and P 2 Q give the same computed answer substitutions. Besides uncertainty on predicates, one can also have incomplete knowledge on the domain of discourse. By considering general interpretations, like in 20], we take into account this kind of incomplete knowledge. Other approaches either do not allow to model this kind of incomplete knowledge or model it by allowing Herbrand interpretations of arbitrary extensions of the module language. In the previous discussed approaches and also in our approach, module composition is seen as a metalinguistic mechanism. Another main direction in the research of compositionality of logic programming formalisms is of a linguistic nature and is seen for instance in 18], 15]. They extend the formalism of Horn clause logic with modal operators in order to provide a richer support for modular programming. In 15], they show that (multi)modal logics are well-suited for supporting the notion of module. Each module is given a name and for each module a modal operator is introduced. They give a modal characterisation of the situation in which the meaning of modules does not depend on the external environment (and on other modules) except for explicit importations. However, they give some hints on how this modal characterisation can also be used to capture the notions of inheritance between modules, of operations on modules such as union or how it can be used to de ne programs with several modules each one with its own internal language. All this o ers lots of possibilities, which are worth investigating further. For a survey of di erent kinds of approaches to modularity, we refer to 9].
Note that we did not consider problems such as: parametrised modules, several experts designing de nitions for the same concepts, several experts overloading the same predicate symbol to represent di erent concepts, . . . . These are topics for future work.
